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IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION: 
PAPERS FROM THE SIXTH ANNUAL CSIS SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFERENCE 
By 





 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (“CSIS”) was founded in 1962 by 
David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke and is one of the most reputable resources for 
commentary and analysis of international challenges facing the world.1 CSIS maintains a staff of 
over 220 people, which focuses on research and analysis of situations to develop policy 
initiatives that look to anticipate global problems and provide insight on current events.2 The 
CSIS is a “bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization” which desires to further public 
understanding of “strategic insights and policy solutions” to “chart a course toward a better 
world.”3 Publications from the CSIS, like In the Wake of Arbitration: Papers from the Sixth 
Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference (“In the Wake of Arbitration”), present unique and 
expert perspectives on topical issues which impact global affairs. 
 Mr. Murray Hiebert is a co-editor of the In the Wake of Arbitration.4 Currently, Mr. 
Hiebert serves as senior advisor and deputy director of the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS.5 
Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Hiebert worked at the United States Chamber of Commerce, where he 
was senior director for Southeast Asia, and before that Mr. Hiebert worked as a journalist for the 
Wall Street Journal’s China bureau.6 Mr. Hiebert has a thorough understanding of the Southeast 
Asia region from his time working as a journalist and his public service at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. 
 Additionally, Mr. Gregory B. Poling is a co-editor of the report.7 Mr. Poling serves as the 
director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and is a Fellow with CSIS in the Southeast 
 
* Kyle B. Ganow is a Books and Literature Section Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2019 Juris Doctor 
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Hiebert et al. eds., 2017).  
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Asia Program.8 Mr. Poling writes extensively on issues in Southeast Asia, but focuses primarily 
on the nations involved in the South China Sea (“SCS”) dispute.9 The final co-editor is Mr. 
Conor Cronin.10 Mr. Cronin serves as a research associate at CSIS in the Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative.11 Each chapter is a paper written by separate authors which have been 
categorized and organized by the editors.  The CSIS In the Wake of Arbitration conference was 




 On July 12, 2016, the long-awaited arbitration decision of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague (“PCA”) delivered its decision on the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) Annex VII arbitration case between the People’s Republic of 
China (“China”) and the Republic of the Philippines (“Philippines”).12 The decision sought to 
clarify conflicting territorial claims of numerous small islands and to further define the exclusive 
economic zones that can be claimed by the various sovereign nations with territorial claims to 
these islands in the SCS.13 However, the award from the arbitral tribunal is legally binding only 
to China and the Philippines.14 China sought to claim “historic rights” to what is known as the 
“Nine-Dash-Line,”15 which China claims existed prior to UNCLOS, while the Philippines sought 
to restrict expansive territorial claims on the SCS.16 
The Philippines used Articles 28617 and 28718 of UNCLOS to initiate the arbitral redress 
 
8 Gregory B. Poling, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, http://www.csis.org/people/gregory-b-




10 IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4. 
 
11 Staff, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, http://www.csis.org/about-us/staff (last visited Sept. 8, 
2017). 
 
12 Jay L. Batongbacal, Philippines v. China: Impact of the Arbitral Tribunal Award on the Merits, IN THE WAKE OF 






15 See generally Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, China versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South 
China Sea, CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS 1, 17 (Aug. 2014). 
 
16 Batongbacal, supra note 12, at 34; see discussion infra Section V for further discussion concerning the PCA 
decision. 
 
17 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 286 (“[A]ny dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, 
where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the 
dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.”). 
 




available under Article 1 of Annex VII.19 The Philippines sought an award which: (1) declared 
both countries’ respective “rights and obligations” in regards to the SCS; (2) determined the 
status of features in the SCS as to whether the features are islands, low tide elevations, or 
submerged banks, as well as whether these features are entitled to the twelve-mile maritime 
zone; and (3) enabled the Philippines to "exercise and enjoy the rights” within the economic zone 
and continental shelf which were established upon ratification of UNCLOS.20 In response, China 
issued a Note Verbale to the Philippines stating that through “consistent and clear” means, China 
only recognizes “territorial disputes over some islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands,” and 
furthermore, China claimed that the two nations had decided to negotiate bilaterally over these 
issues rather than take the dispute to UNCLOS arbitration. 21 
 The PCA decision will have an impact on many different fields, but In the Wake of 
Arbitration divides the chapters in to four broad categories: (1) “The South China Sea in 2016” 
(2) “Legal Issues,” (3) “Military Modernization and Capacity Building,” and (4) “The 
Environmental Question.”22 These four categories provide readers with clear delineation of how 
issues will be approached and, therefore, readers can focus on the area which most interests 
them.  
In the Wake of Arbitration provides a great array of papers from well-informed experts 
that highlight areas of concern with the PCA decision and the implications for future 
developments in the region. This review will focus on the category of “Legal Issues” and the 
expert opinions therein, but summaries of each category will be provided because the PCA 
arbitral award has far-reaching legal implications across the topic areas discussed within this 
book. 
 
III. INITIATION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 
 
 The dispute between the Philippines and China raises concerns over the use of the SCS 
and access to rich fishing grounds, crucial shipping lanes, and what is believed to be large 
quantities of oil and gas resources.23 The arbitration proceeding, brought through UNCLOS, was 
made possible by both the Philippines and China ratifying the treaty within their respective 
nations.24 Specifically, Part XV of UNCLOS provides a variety of dispute resolution procedures, 
including compulsory arbitration found in Annex VII.25 
 Importantly, the PCA does not have the power to grant sovereign rights over land in the 
SCS because the PCA does not have jurisdiction to do so.26 Additionally, the tribunal did not 
 
19 The Republic of the Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19 i, 15 (Oct. 29, 2015) (Award on Jurisdiction and 




21 Id. See generally infra Section III. 
 
22 IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at Parts 3-4. 
 





26Award, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
122 
 
make an express ruling on any maritime boundaries between the two nations because China has 
excluded that portion of the UNCLOS from compulsory dispute resolution.27 The tribunal made 
the ruling based on the rights and obligations of the two nations.28 
 The Philippines sought resolutions and declarations from the tribunal in four categories of 
disputes, which are: (1) resolve a dispute regarding maritime rights and entitlements in the SCS; 
(2) resolve disputes concerning entitlements to maritime zones generated by the UNCLOS, with 
respect to various island features in the SCS; (3) declare whether China is acting pursuant to 
international law with respect to interfering with Philippines’ rights under UNCLOS to exploit 
natural resources on the SCS and whether China is failing to protect and preserve the marine 
environment and overfishing of the seas; and (4) find whether China aggravated this dispute by 
refusing the Philippines access to a detachment of Philippine marines stationed at Second 
Thomas Shoal.29 
 Throughout the arbitration, China refused to accept the proceedings and declined to 
participate in the hearings because in China’s view, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over all the 
claims made by the Philippines.30  Despite China’s lack of cooperation, on January 22, 2013, the 
Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China through UNCLOS articles 286 and 287.31 
The Philippines submitted a Notification and Statement of Claim which requested a 
determination on a variety of matters resulting from Chinese action in the SCS.32 China issued a 
Note Verbale,33 rejecting the arbitration, and noted that bilateral negotiations resolved another 
dispute over territorial claims in the SCS and bilateral negotiations should resolve this disputes.34 
 Disregarding China’s objections to the arbitral proceedings, the Philippines continued in 
pursuit of a UNCLOS tribunal and appointed a judge under article 3 of Annex VII.35 By July 12, 
2013, the tribunal issued Administrative Directive No. One, which appointed the PCA as registry 





27Award, supra note 23, at 2. 
 
28 Id. at 2. 
 
29Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 2-3. 
 
30 Id. at 4. 
 




33 A diplomatic note that is more formal than an aide-mémoire and less formal than a note, is drafted in the third 
person, and is never signed.  Note Verbale, The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (New Ed. 2016). 
 
34 Id. at 12. 
 







IV. PART ONE: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN 2016 
 
 The Editors of In the Wake of Arbitration set the scene of the state of the SCS prior to the 
PCA ruling with Part One of the book. Using the United States37 and Malaysia38 as examples, the 
authors of the first two chapters demonstrate how various nations have approached the issues of 
the SCS. Starting in 2014, the United States, as well as other nations, began to challenge the 
Chinese claim of territorial sovereignty to the Nine-Dash Line.39 These two papers provide 
opposing methods of handling the issues presented by Chinese activity in the SCS.  
 
A.  U.S. South China Sea Policy 2015-2016: The Growing role of the Defense 
Department, by Michael McDevitt 
 
McDevitt begins with a powerful quote from Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, 
“[t]here should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international 
law allows . . . .”40 This statement has been echoed by many in Washington, D.C., including 
President Barack Obama, as an attempt to no longer appear “toothless” on the Chinese claim of 
sovereignty over all land features in the SCS.41 McDevitt’s introduction effectively sets up the 
rest of the first chapter because the operational measures undertaken by the United States Navy 
stem from these initial comments by Secretary Carter.42 
Concern over the sovereignty of these islands is not simple; quickly, China is 
transforming these islands into Chinese military outposts.43 Former Director of National 
Intelligence, James Clapper, confirmed what many believed: the Chinese "land reclamation and 
construction” on the islands is aimed to establish a strong People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(“PLAN”) in the SCS.44 Concern for Chinese territorial expansion further into the SCS is not just 
of concern over military expansion and regional intimidation tactics, but also apprehensions 
surrounding control over highly profitable trade routes and access to extract natural resources, 
namely oil and gas, raise alarms in the United States and other regional stakeholders.45 
 The United States began Freedom of Navigation Operations (“FONOP”) on October 27, 
 
37 Michael McDevitt, U.S. South China Sea Policy 2015-2016: The Growing Role of the Defense Department, in IN 
THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 3.   
 
38 Elina Noor, Understanding Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea Dispute, in IN THE WAKE OF 
ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 18.   
 
39 McDevitt, supra note 37, at 15. 
 
40 Id. at 3 (quoting Ashton Carter, Sec’y of Def., during his presentation at the IISS, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore 
(May 30, 2015)). 
 




43 Id. at 6. 
 
44 McDevitt, supra note 37, at 6.  
 
45 Id. at 7. 
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2015, with instructions for a U.S. Navy destroyer to sail within twelve-nautical miles of the Subi 
Reef (a Chinese reclaimed island).46 FONOP are aimed to demonstrate that the United States 
intends on maintaining a strong policy with regards to FONOP rules outlined within UNCLOS.47 
Illustrated by the initial quote of the chapter, that the United States does not recognize Chinese 
territorial interests to the Nine-Dash Line.48 
 McDevitt’s chapter lays out the United States’ concerns with the Chinese territorial 
claims within the SCS. The historical information provided and the current public policy stance 
offers readers a basic knowledge of the key players, regional concerns, and future directions that 
could be taken by the key actors. Furthermore, the chapter sets the stage for the key question of 
the SCS controversy: whether international law, through UNCLOS arbitration proceedings, can 
resolve this specific SCS dispute and provide stability to a region in which many countries lay 
competing claims to significant portions of the sea through their exclusive economic zones.49  
 
B. Understanding Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea Dispute, by Elina Noor 
 
Malaysia’s actions, with respect to the Chinese territorial claims on the SCS, are a clear 
indicator of the importance of the PCA arbitral proceeding. The Malaysian and Chinese 
governments have always maintained a “special relationship” due to economic and political ties 
between the two nations.50 Many observers of the SCS dispute have commented on Malaysia’s 
approach with “curiosity, puzzlement, frustration, and [. . .] disdain” for what has been described 
as an insufficient response to the aggressive actions made in the area by Chinese parties.51 
 The SCS is an important resource for Malaysia; the country is made up of many islands 
and stretches 1,600-kilometers from east to west, and West Malaysia is separated from East 
Malaysia by 600-kilometers of the SCS.52 Many observers see massive Chinese investment deals 
within the nation as a manner of buying support on the SCS; however, Malaysia has maintained 
close relationships with other regional powers and remains steadfast to defense and security 
agreements and partnerships with the United States, Japan, and India.53  
 Noor provides three examples of Malaysia working to maintain the status quo of the 
regional dispute: (1) Malaysia has ceased construction on various installations on five of the 
Spratlys Islands in the SCS to which Malaysia lays claim; (2) Malaysia refrained from provoking 
nationalist sentiment by keeping SCS news out of the media; and (3) Malaysia has “resisted 
 




48 Id. at 15. 
 
49 See generally id.  
 
50 Noor, supra note 38, at 18. 
 
51 Id.  
 
52 Id. at 19. 
 




persuasions” which might allow non-regional third parties into this regional dispute.54 Noor 
claims Malaysian actions have been consistent in respects that: (1) Malaysia rejects the Nine-
Dash Line territorial claims by China;55 (2) the dispute should be resolved through peaceful 
means and in compliance within international law established under UNCLOS; and (3) third-
party dispute resolution legal mechanisms should be considered, albeit third-party dispute 
resolution mechanisms are Malaysia’s “lesser preferred” manner in which to resolve the SCS 
dispute.56 
 Noor summarizes this chapter with an overview of Malaysia’s response after the PCA 
ruling under Annex VII to the 1982 UNCLOS calling on all parties to maintain “full respect for 
diplomatic and legal processes.”57 This chapter concludes on an ominous note as the author 
focuses on the issue that Malaysia’s strategy has worked up until this point. However, Malaysia 
needs to recognize limitations and continue to use practical options within its reach, due to 
Malaysia’s limited capabilities.58 Therefore, Malaysia must continue to balance the needs of its 
people and the defense of its sovereign territory.  
One issue in this chapter is the enforcement of arbitral awards; for example, China will 
not respect the arbitral award rendered against it.  Technically, the UNCLOS arbitration is only 
binding to the Philippines and China, but the capability of smaller nations to enforce a UNCLOS 
arbitral award on an ever-expanding power, like China, will be a challenge for the region due to 
China’s refusal to recognize any decision on the SCS.  The only manner in which China will 
recognize the Award is if the UNCLOS decision acknowledges their sovereignty to the Nine-
Dash-Line. 
 
V. PART TWO: LEGAL ISSUES 
 
 Part Two of In the Wake of Arbitration addresses important legal issues faced by the 
arbitral proceedings. In this section, the editors selected works which outline issues surrounding 
the award, the effects on international law, and the effects on military law. Additionally, because 
of China’s protest to arbitration, China never sent agents or approved of representatives at the 
arbitral proceedings.59 The lack of Chinese participation signaled that China will not adhere to 
the arbitral award. However, the PCA tribunal went to great lengths to reason each point, even 
taking steps to interpret the evidence in the most favorable light to Chinese interests.  
 
A. Philippines v. China: Impact of the Arbitral Tribunal Award on the Merits, by Jay L. 
Batongbacal 
 
Part Two begins with a chapter that examines the arbitral awards on the merits. In the 
 
54 Noor, supra note 38, at 21-22. 
 
55 Id. at 22 n.13. 
 
56 Id. at 22. 
 








chapter by Jay L. Batongbacal, he seeks to provide the legal context of international law and the 
issues of sovereignty in the SCS, as well as indicate a direction forward.60 How the two nations 
will honor the arbitral award is not clear.  The Philippines earned favorable awards on all their 
submissions to UNCLOS, however, Chinese actions indicate the intention to continue island 
reclamation in opposition to the award and international law.61  
The PCA tribunal decided in favor of the Philippines in five broad categories, which can 
guide other parties with SCS disputes on how to interact amongst one another pending the 
resolution of other SCS disputes.62 Importantly, the PCA interpreted and struck down the most 
expansive territorial claims China maintains in the SCS: the Nine-Dash Line.63 Even though 
China asserts historic title to the SCS, the tribunal, not waiting for a Chinese explanation (which 
likely would never arrive, as China was not planning to participate in the PCA tribunal), used 
statements from past diplomatic communications to demonstrate the “varied and sometimes 
contradictory” territorial claims.64 
Interestingly, the author makes note of a portion of the tribunal award which focuses on 
China’s negotiation of UNCLOS. China could have negotiated for not allowing other states to 
claim resources within another coastal state’s exclusive economic zone.65 Interestingly, China, 
by negotiating the UNCLOS treaty, had given up historical rights by ratifying the treaty. 
Additionally, the PCA tribunal notes China is not entitled to claim historic rights because: (1) 
such a claim was never officially clarified until 2009; (2) China has yet to exercise exclusive 
control over the waters within the Nine-Dash Line; and (3) no other state affected by Chinese 
territorial claims accepted these claims.66 
Batongbacal asserts certain loopholes with respect to “territorial enclaves scattered across 
the area” could be used, and might start a conflict, as many of the disputed territories are 
scattered across Philippine territorial water.67 Furthermore, the author contends that unilateral 
actions by China, especially ones which contradict international law, in all likelihood continue to 
lead towards destabilizing the SCS region and could negatively impact the states which rely on 
the SCS for years to come.68  
Chapter three aims to provide a foundation for the understanding of the PCA award and a 
discussion of the reasoning behind the tribunal’s decision. While focusing on the award, one 
overarching theme is missing, how will such an expansive award be enforced against China? 
Additionally, if the award is technically only binding between the two nations involved in this 
case, does the award fall solely on the Philippines to enforce? Perhaps, one of the main reasons 
 
60 Batongbacal, supra note 12, at 33. 
 
61 Id. at 46. 
 
62 Id. at 33. 
 
63 Id. at 34. 
 
64 Id. at 34 (citing Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 71). 
 
65 Batongbacal, supra note 12, at 36. 
 
66 Id. at 37. 
 





little information on the impact of the award was discussed was that the award was released the 
same day as the conference.  Thus, international reaction was happening in real time as the 
authors delivered their remarks. Nevertheless, the editors, prior to publishing the book, should 
have added an addendum to provide the reader an idea of how the arbitral award has impacted 
the SCS. 
 
B. The Effects of the South China Sea Dispute and the Arbitral Ruling on UNCLOS and 
International Law, by Erik Franckx 
 
Although one of the shortest chapters of In the Wake of Arbitration, chapter four provides 
the reader with a plethora of information, including the basis of Annex VII arbitration 
proceedings and the mechanisms behind the proceedings. The chapter goes into concise detail 
about how Annex VII and ITLOS arbitrations operate, their similarities and differences, as well 
as explaining the role of PCA throughout all these UNCLOS arbitration proceedings. This 
chapter should be placed earlier in the book because the chapter summarizes the vital legal issues 
in a matter of fact way which allows the reader to understand important aspects of this tribunal. 
Erik Franckx, the author of chapter four, begins immediately with a discussion on how 
his contribution is unlike the other works within the book because his focus aimed towards the 
effects of the award, and the effects on international law in a broad sense.69 As the CSIS In the 
Wake of Arbitration conference was held on the same day as the award was released, this chapter 
is rather short but includes useful/relevant information on previous UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral 
awards, the organization of the PCA, and how UNCLOS functions as a matter of international 
law. 
 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) was one of three 
conventional bodies established by UNCLOS.70 Through Annex VI of UNCLOS, the ITLOS 
tribunals should hear all disputes arising out of UNCLOS, unless parties agree otherwise.71 The 
ITLOS tribunal chose the PCA as the registry of the proceedings and adopted PCA’s Rules of 
Procedures to govern the ITLOS tribunal between the Philippines and China.72  Due to the recent 
release of the tribunal’s ruling, Franckx opts to look at other cases in which PCA is designated at 
the registry to examine how Annex VII cases of UNCLOS develop and are received upon 
issuance.73 While the PCA, which is not the ruling law of these cases, has seen an increase in 
cases recently, the author notes that nonparticipation is on the rise as well.74 Further, the author 
notes since UNCLOS came into full effect in 1994, PCA has acted as the registry for all Annex 
VII cases except for one.75 
 
69 Erik Franckx, The Effects of the South China Sea Dispute and the Arbitral Ruling on UNCLOS and International 
Law, in IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 47. 
 
70 Id. at 48. 
 
71 Id. nn.3-4.  
 
72 See Id. at 47-48. 
 
73 Id. at 51. 
 
74 Franckx, supra note 69, at 51-52. 
 
75 Id. at 52 n.39. 
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 Historically speaking, UNCLOS arbitral awards are relatively new, since the first award 
rendered through the PCA registry was in 2005.76 Only seventeen other cases have been brought 
by nations through the Annex VII arbitration clauses, six of which result in awards on the merits, 
according to the PCA registry, while the remaining eleven were dismissed, ended by settlement 
of the parties, or are still pending.77  
Interestingly, Philippines v. China is the first Annex VII arbitration to determine how to 
handle a defendant unwilling to participate.78 However, being a signatory state on the UNCLOS 
treaty renders a non-appearing state subject to the decisions of the tribunal, as Annex VII 
tribunals take the non-appearing party’s legal interests into account while making any ruling.79 
Furthermore, Franckx argues that the ITLOS cases and the UNCLOS Annex VII cases, over the 
same period of time, demonstrate that nations are willing to use the Annex VII arbitration 
procedures, and that these cases are resulting in more awards on the merits than cases decided 
through the ITLOS mechanism.80 Additionally, international disputes through UNCLOS Annex 
VII tribunals will help further develop how arbitration can influence international law, and 
enforcement mechanisms must be put into place to uphold decisions and compensate these 
developments. 
 
C. The Law Concerning Military Activities on the Continental Shelf in the Aftermath of the 
South China Sea Arbitration, by James Kraska 
 
Chapter five, by James Kraska, begins to examine the legal aspects of military activities 
and the development and reclamation projects on the islands in the SCS. The chapter points to 
the deference given, as discussed in chapter four, to non-participating parties and the willingness 
of an arbitral tribunal to rely on public statements made by Chinese officials concerning military 
activity in the SCS.81 Thus, UNCLOS Annex VII tribunals seek to operate in a manner which 
aims to resolve the issue at hand and to be fair to all parties no matter the level of involvement.82 
The tribunal allowed China to label all specific activities in the SCS as “military 
activities” which, under Part XV of UNCLOS, allows China to effectively ignore much of the 
arbitral proceedings due to certain mechanisms within the UNCLOS treaty.83 The PCA was 
required to determine whether the Philippines brought this dispute, which specifically 
“concerned military activities” and not just a dispute over all “military activities.”84 If the PCA 
 
76 Franckx, supra note 69 at 52. 
 
77 Id. at 55-56, Table 4.1. 
 
78 Id. at 54.  
 




81 James Kraska, The Law Concerning Military Activities on the Continental Shelf in the Aftermath of the South 
China Sea Arbitration, in IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 58. 
 
82 See id. 
 
83 Id. at 59. 
 
84 Id. at 59-60. 
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determined a general dispute over all military activities, then Annex VII arbitration mechanisms 
could not be used due to an exclusion clause in UNCLOS Article 298, which precludes arbitral 
jurisdiction of UNCLOS over general military disputes.85 
 Kraska emphasizes the importance of UNCLOS determinations of seascape 
classifications. The classification of a feature as an island, a high-tide elevation, or a low-tide 
elevation had different maritime zone entitlements,86 which could extend the exclusive economic 
zone and cause further conflict in the region.87  
 Additionally, Kraska pointedly argues that Chinese construction of artificial islands 
within the Philippine exclusive economic zone is not inherently unlawful; however, due to the 
scale and effect of the construction, China violated its responsibility to “environmental 
stewardship.”88 The author uses the end of the chapter to lay groundwork for the important legal 
aspects of the award relating to the environmental protection of the reefs in the SCS being 
damaged by island reclamation projects.89 Foreign activity within another country’s exclusive 
economic zone is typically allowed so long as any effect is only incidental.90 However, the 
building of islands through land reclamation and dredging is an intensive process which could 
have major impacts on the Philippine exclusive economic zone. Additionally, untold 
environmental damage is taking place to the sea floor during the island reclamation process.   
 
VI. PART THREE: MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
 Military implications for Southeast Asia are important, as much of the activity has been 
seen as a Chinese militarization of the reclaimed islands. Additionally, modernization of the 
Chinese military has some experts beginning to question what goals China has for these 
islands.91 Part Three takes an in depth look at a variety of military issues regarding the nations 
that have a stake in the ruling of the PCA, and other regional powers within the SCS. 
 
A. China’s Military Modernization and the South China Sea, by Timothy R. Heath 
 
The PLAN is increasing capabilities through its eleventh major reorganization since 
1952, which has regional stakeholders concerned for what intentions China has with the island 
reclamation projects upon completion.92 Chinese military strategists have regarded the SCS as a 
 
85 Kraska, supra note 81, at 59-60. 
 




88 Id. at 66. 
 
89 See discussion infra Section VII. 
 
90 Kraska, supra note 81, at 66. 
 
91 Id. at 61 
 
92 Timothy R. Heath, China’s Military Modernization and the South China Sea, in IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, 




key security issue, and see dangers in other nations’ activities near the SCS as a threat to 
“China’s maritime rights and interest.”93 While China does not believe its southern neighbors are 
of much concern, with respect to military capabilities, China is concerned over the capabilities of 
the Japanese and Taiwanese militaries.94 
 The People's Liberation Army (“PLA”) is undergoing a modernization effort to project 
power at longer ranges.95 China’s current inability to protect Chinese reclaimed islands due to 
lack of long range military support capabilities is of great concern to Chinese military strategists, 
because these same islands are within striking distance of Vietnam’s and the Philippines’ 
military installations.96 Modernization of the PLA plays a major role in developing China’s 
capabilities to defend core interests in the SCS as well as conduct peacetime operations and 
maintain influence in the region.97 
 This chapter mainly focuses on the manners in which China aims to increase their 
military capabilities. While every United Nations member state has a right to self-defense, 98 the 
Chinese expansion of its military capabilities and control into international waters, within the 
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, violated the terms of UNCLOS and was among the 
issues raised in the UNCLOS tribunal.99 This chapter clarifies Chinese goals, challenges, and 
mission in the SCS and provides a detailed look as to how PLA and PLAN activities have 
focused on supporting the island reclamation projects. These goals seem attainable for the 
Chinese military because the arbitral tribunal is only binding to the Philippines and China, and 
while other nations can seek assist in the enforcement of the PCA award, only the Philippines 
has the legal right to seek enforcement under the UNCLOS treaty. 
 
B. Indonesia’s Naval and Coast Guard Upgrades and Jokowi’s Global Maritime 
Fulcrum, by Natalie Sambhi 
 
Natalie Sambhi authored chapter seven of In the Wake of Arbitration, which looks at 
another regional power within the SCS.100 While the Philippines and China are the only nations 
bound by the rulings of the arbitral proceeding, other regional powers were waiting intently to 
see how the region power might shift. Sambhi provides insight as to how Indonesia handles its 
claims to the SCS, what actions have been taken to push back Chinese territorial expansion, and 
what military options Indonesia is maintaining within this region. 
Indonesia consists of approximately 16,000 islands, amounting to roughly three-million-
 
93 Heath, supra note 92, at 71 
 
94 Id. at 72. 
 




97 Id. at 78. 
 
98 See generally U.N. Charter art. 51 ¶ 1. 
 
99 Award, supra note 23, at 11. 
 
100 Natalie Sambhi, Indonesia’s Naval and Coast Guard Upgrades and Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum, in IN 
THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 83. 
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square-miles.101  Water, sea transport, and resources from territorial seas play a vital role in 
Indonesian national interests and to Indonesian citizens, who depend on these resources.102 
Regional tensions between Indonesia and China center largely on illegal fishing within 
Indonesian territorial waters.103 However, enforcing territorial waters and the boundaries of the 
Indonesian exclusive economic zone is difficult due to the lack of resources and capabilities of 
the Indonesian Coast Guard and Navy.104 Many regional stakeholders, including Indonesia, will 
look to how the PCA arbitral award impacts Chinese actions and what deterrent future UNCLOS 
arbitration might have on China’s use of the SCS. 
 This chapter further discusses a 2015 “Defense White Paper” which outlined the 
Indonesian Defense Ministry’s strategy for the near future.105 The GMF is not highlighted in any 
significant way, from which Sambhi infers that Indonesia might not be in a position to take on 
the challenges it faces in the SCS until internal defense is achieved.106 Further, the United States 
has expanded assistance to the region and provided training and funding, as well as opportunities 
for Indonesia to increase cooperation with United States Navy activities,107 which is counter to 
the  long-standing Indonesian policy of nonalignment with regional and world powers (including 
China and the United States).108 
 Sambhi asserts that future disputes in the SCS will continue to drive Indonesia further 
towards modernization of maritime capabilities.109 One issue the author does not discuss is that 
UNCLOS arbitral rulings can only resolve portions of disputes in the SCS.110 Thus, further 
diplomatic measures are needed as well to prevent continued intensifying tensions in the region 
due to military modernization and buildup of the nations with stakes in the SCS. The author ends 
this chapter with optimism about the future of Indonesia and the clear direction the president 
wishes to lead the nation.111 The PCA ruling set a precedent that will help Indonesia, if 
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C. Military Modernization and Capacity Building in the Philippines and Vietnam, by 
Carlyle A. Thayer 
 
Much of the SCS dispute revolves around the perceived notion that China is expanding 
military capabilities within the region and raising tensions through the further development and 
installation of military equipment on the reclaimed islands.112 Chapter eight begins to focus on 
the Filipino response to the Chinese efforts as well as focusing primarily on the modernization of 
both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (“AFP”) and the Vietnam People’s Army (“VPA”).113 
Each country within the region has been looking to modernize its respective military force, and 
arguably, these modernizations are the main driver behind most of the tensions in the SCS.114 
 Carlyle A. Thayer divides chapter eight into five sections, and the first section provides 
historical background on military modernization within both the Philippines and Vietnam.115 
Parts two and three cover military capabilities and expansions from 2010 until present day, while 
part four discusses the role of the United States with respect to these two nations, and part five 
provides summaries and concluding thoughts of the author.116 This chapter does not discuss any 
aspect of the PCA arbitral tribunal and only cursorily mentions the issues directly relating to the 
Philippines complaints against China.117 While this chapter is thoroughly researched and well 
organized, further discussion of military capabilities is outside the purview of this review. 
 
VII. PART FOUR: THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTION 
 
 With so much focus on military buildup, modernization of naval fleets, and control over 
disputed reefs, media and nations often forget the environmental issues facing the SCS. In the 
Wake of Arbitration includes three chapters on various topics relating to the environmental 
impacts of the activities underway in the SCS.  Many of the reclaimed islands are coral reefs, and 
the authors focus on the coral reefs to raise concerns both for the impact that has already 
occurred and what concerns exist for extraction of natural resources in the SCS.118 
 
A. Destroyed Reefs, Vanishing Giant Clams: Marine Imperialism, by E. D. Gomez 
 
Coral reefs throughout the SCS are being destroyed, estimated at over 311-hectares of 
coral reefs within the Spratly islands.119 Chinese backers quickly justified their destruction of 
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these delicate ecosystems by citing other nations’ destruction of reefs in the past and currently 
through reclamation projects.120 However, E.D. Gomez, author of chapter nine, quickly points 
out that by using satellite imagery, researchers have “objectively measure[d] ocean filling” 
activity, and found that within the Spratly Islands of the SCS, four nations have been responsible 
for about five-percent of the reclamation damage to the environment, while China is responsible 
for ninety-five-percent.121 Additionally, China is solely responsible for environmental damage 
related to reclamation on the Paracel Islands in the SCS.122 
Unfortunately, chapter nine does not discuss any issue relating to the UNCLOS arbitral 
proceedings or how the arbitral award might impact environmental issues in the SCS.123 
However, this is an important chapter for the reader to understand that the SCS issues are more 
than just militarization and control over economically valuable shipping routes. As an ecologist 
specializing in coral reefs, Gomez sets the stage for concerns raised in the PCA finding that 
“China has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States bordering the [SCS] concerning 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment . . . .”124 Additionally, the PCA award 
found China was inflicting severe harm on the environment, and that many of the complaints by 
the Philippines require Chinese action to mitigate the problems caused by land reclamation 
projects.125 Thus, China is not upholding its duty to protect the marine environment, which is 
another issue to consider for enforcement of the arbitral award. 
 
B. Offshore Coral Reefs and High-Tide Features of the South China Sea: Origins, 
Resources, Recent Damage, and Potential Peace Parks, by John W. McManus 
 
James W. McManus, author of chapter ten, provides the most substantial discussion and 
analysis of environmental issues as they relate to legal responsibilities chapter ten.126 While this 
chapter focuses heavily on coral reef development, growth, and environmental issues 
surrounding their destruction, a large section of the chapter delves into how UNCLOS handles 
environmental claims.127 The chapter also presents additional information regarding the type of 
damage being done by dredging and construction on these reefs.128 
China had maintained that island-building activities on these reefs did not harm the 
environment, but actually promoted coral reef growth.129 However, McManus argues that this is 
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likely legal posturing under UNCLOS so that China can more easily claim these man-made 
islands as natural islands or rocks rather than “artificial islands,”130 because according to 
UNCLOS article 60 §8, “[a]rtificial islands . . . do not possess the status of islands. They have no 
territorial sea of their own . . . .”131 McManus interprets the award from the PCA tribunal as one 
that would never recognize island building as a means in which a country could have an island 
qualify for an exclusive economic zone.132 According to the UNCLOS treaty, Islands must be 
natural structures above high tide to be declared a natural island or a rock.133 The PCA ruling 
implies that if a nation possesses a parcel of land, in an atoll, which the nation needs to augment 
in any way to raise it above sea level at high tide, then that parcel of land will likely not be 
designated as a natural island or rock but rather receive a more fitting designation, like coral 
island.134  Thus, the land in question will not receive the protections allotted to that of a natural 
island or rock, with respect to UNCLOS.135 
Other parts of the chapter include discussions of habitability of offshore atolls, dredging 
and island construction within the SCS, and implications for fisheries.136 While these topics 
cover other aspects in relation to SCS and provide analysis for claims of the Philippines, 
McManus focuses on the environmental impact and what concerns are brought about by these 
activities.137 McManus notes in the conclusion that even if little or no enforcement of the arbitral 
award comes as a result of the PCA arbitral proceeding between the Philippines and China, the 
arbitration raises valid concerns, regarding damage to the environment in the SCS due to damage 
to the sea floor and overfishing.138 Of importance, the arbitral proceeding found that China failed 
to protect the environment from overfishing within the SCS.139 Importantly, fishing was 
occurring in areas of the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines which raised the concern of 
damage being done to endangered species within the SCS and what measures can be taken to 
prevent this from occurring in the future.140  McManus notes that enforcement will play a vital 
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C. Marine Biodiversity at the Spratly Islands and Proposal for Establishing Marine 
Protected Areas, by Kwang-Tsa Shao 
 
The final chapter of In the Wake of Arbitration concerns itself with developing protected 
areas in the SCS.142 The author, Kwang-Tsao Shao, begins the chapter by describing the SCS, 
the nations with a stake in the future of the SCS, and the various protected areas that currently 
exist in the SCS.143 Part of the reason the Philippines brought these disputes before the UNCLOS 
tribunal was due to the fact China was not allowing access to various areas of the SCS within the 
Philippines own exclusive economic zone.144 While Shao thoroughly explains the environmental 
concerns, and the ecological factors that are present in the SCS, he includes little discussion of 
the arbitral proceedings.145  
However, the chapter presents an interesting alternative for how to handle the disputes on 
the SCS by turning the area into a protected marine environment and seeks other existing means 
to protect the SCS.146 Shao’s suggestion is to develop the disputed territories into international 
marine preserves which would act to conserve the environment and allow a nongovernmental 
organization to control and monitor the area.147 This idea would take international cooperation to 
accomplish and would likely be among the most peaceful ways to resolve all SCS disputes 
without the need for further arbitration.  
Similar to chapter eight, chapter eleven gives little information on the impact of the 
arbitral award, likely due to the authors writing their opinions on the day the award was released. 
However, the PCA tribunal advocates for the preservation of the marine environment and that 
Chinese island reclamation projects have done irreparable harm to many of the reefs and islands 
in the SCS.148 The author, in agreement with the arbitral award, seeks to provide environmentally 
friendly ways to not only protect the SCS environment, but to help the world avoid calamity over 
these valuable waters.149 
 
 
VIII. ARBITRAL AWARD 
 
As Batongbacal wrote in chapter two, the Philippines “made a clean sweep of nearly all 
its submissions” to the arbitral tribunal.150 In the published award ruling, the tribunal carefully 
 
 
142 Kwang-Tsao Shao  ̧Marine Biodiversity at Spratly Islands and Proposal for Establishing Marine Protected 
Areas, in IN THE WAKE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 148. 
143 Shao, supra note 142, at 148. 
 
144 See Award, supra note 23, at 2-3. 
 




147 Id. at 154. 
 
148 Award, supra note 23, at 475-477. 
 
149 Shao, supra note 142, at 157-58. 




laid out its reasoning as to the four main categories of complaints of the Philippines.  The 
arbitrators evaluated and categorized each submission.151 Noticeably, each category contains 
positions of both the Philippines and China; even though China was not participating in the 
tribunal, the tribunal did go to great lengths to consider Chinese interests.152 
The arbitral award summary elaborates on how the parties involved need to conduct their 
respective activities after this award.153 The award declares that China has breached its 
obligations under UNCLOS articles 279, 296, and 300, as well as general international law.154 
Moreover, both parties are to respect “rights and freedoms” of each other as well as other states 
under UNCLOS.155 Additionally, the tribunal stated both the Philippines and China will be 
assumed to be acting in good faith within the merits of this award, and the award shall be 
complied with while any further grievances shall be resolved through a peaceful manner in 
accordance with UNCLOS.156 The tribunal concluded that because Chinese fishing vessels were 
all but ignored by Chinese marine surveillance vessels, China failed to exercise due diligence, 
thus, is at fault for not preventing exploitation of the Philippine’s exclusive economic zone 




 While the book’s chapters were organized into discrete parts, the order in which the 
chapters were presented could be improved. The editors chose to begin the book with a chapter 
on United States policy with respect to the SCS. While this seems like a logical starting point for 
an American think-tank, a major problem is that the United States has yet to ratify UNCLOS and 
only recognizes the treaty as customary international law.158 Additionally, as Batongbacal wrote 
in chapter three, the award technically is only legally binding to the Philippines and China.159 
Thus, the editors’ choice to begin with a country that has not formally adopted UNCLOS and is 
not legally bound by any award of the PCA tribunal comes off as a little puzzling.  Currently, 
there is no adherence to the arbitral award by the Chinese, and as a Chinese diplomat said ruling 
is no more than “waste paper.”160 
In the Wake of Arbitration is a good survey to begin researching issues regarding the 
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disputed claims of the SCS due to the wide variety of topics covered by the book. Each chapter is 
thoughtful and well-written by the individual authors. The book allowed experts in many fields 
to comment, describe concerns, and provide solutions to mitigate problems in their particular 
field of expertise. While each chapter takes on a specific topic related to the arbitral proceedings, 
the manner and the proceedings were not as thoroughly discussed in relation to each topic. 
Overall, the book provides excellent resources for further research into an assortment of topics 
that were affected by the arbitral proceedings. 
